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The article aims to explain the foreign policy doctrine of the Barack Obama administration, describe the core principles and assump-
tions it is based on and in this context, analyze the concrete steps it undertook in international relations.
It is well-known that Barack Obama’s foreign policy is based on an important recognition. Namely, the world has become much 
more multipolar today than it was even ten years ago. This means that America can no longer be the only state that dictates its order to the 
world. Therefore, America should no longer be the only state responsible for providing the global “public goods” as well. However, world 
still needs the US’s leadership. Today, America is the only state that possesses the necessary power and influence to lead in dealing with 
the issues, such as the maintenance of the open and stable economic system, climate change and global warming, nuclear proliferation, 
the fight against international crime etc., and succeed in involving all relevant global players in the process as they are common for all. 
The US leadership, as well as the peaceful evolution of the international order depends on how America succeeds to engage the world’s 
leading states into the cooperation for resolution of these issues. The most important challenge for the United States in the 21st century, 
however, will be the reforming of the current world order that is a kind of a hierarchical liberal institutionalism, based on the American 
hegemony, experiencing a legitimacy crisis in today’s world. In this way America will, for the third time in its existence, continue to lead 
in the formation of an international order that will be an open, rule-based, evolutional form of the liberal institutionalism, where the newly 
emerging powers will manage to pursue their vital interests and this fact, together with American leadership will be the guarantor for the 
stability of the new international order.
Keywords: Obama foreign policy doctrine, liberal institutionalism, evolution of liberal institutionalism, multipolar world, America 
in multipolar world, American hegemony
Introduction
Much controversy surrounds the current US foreign 
policy. In comparison to Bush’s unilateral foreign poli-
cies, Obama’s foreign policy record proves inspiring and 
hopeful. Domestically, administration supporters evalu-
ate his, approach as calculating and pragmatic. His politi-
cal opponents, however, claim that the United States un-
der Barack Obama is “less assertive, less dominant, less 
power-minded, less focused on the American people’s par-
ticular interests, and less concerned about preserving U.S. 
freedom of action.” (Feith, 2011) The domestic political 
opponents usually blame the president for his conciliatory 
policy in international relations, which some perceive as 
a retreat and weakness, as well as for his willingness to 
join a number of international treaties that in their opin-
ion would undermine the freedom of action of the US, and 
therefore, its sovereignty. The recent events in Libya high-
light these accusations of weakness, as Obama’s critics de-
scribed the president’s decision to intervene in Libya only 
with the approval of the Arab League and the UN Security 
Council as “leading from the back” or “keeping the United 
States within the bounds set by the United Nations Security 
Council.” (Feith, 2011)
The article aims to explain the foreign policy doc-
trine of the Barack Obama administration, describe the 
core principles and assumptions it is based on and in this 
context, analyze the concrete steps it undertook in interna-
tional relations.
Theoretical Backgrounds
It is well-known that Barack Obama’s foreign policy 
is based on an important recognition. Namely, the world 
has become much more multipolar today than it was even 
ten years ago. This means that America can no longer be 
the only state that dictates its order to the world. There-
fore, America should no longer be the only state respon-
sible for providing the global “public goods” as well. At 
his West Point speech, in May 2010, Obama declared that 
“The United States cannot act alone in the world,” adding 
that “the burdens of this century cannot fall on our soldiers 
alone. It also cannot fall on American shoulders alone … 
the United States must strengthen existing alliances and 
build new partnerships.” (Text of Obama’s Speech to West 
Point 2010 Cadets, 2010)
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The current foreign policy of the US is based on the 
analysis of this century’s changing international system 
and the ongoing processes in international relations that by 
their nature are completely different from what the world 
has already experienced. These changes are not simply ex-
plained with the decline of American power or the so called 
“rise of the rest”. Rather, they are the result of the more 
fundamental changes in the international system caused by 
the unique events and processes that are indicative of the 
21st century realities.
The power of the US is declining but it is still the only 
country that controls the global commons and is able to 
project its force worldwide. The main question focuses 
on what can be constituted as power in this century that 
enables states to influence the processes and achieve de-
sirable outcomes. It is paradoxical but in our information 
era when we have access to all kind of data for evaluating 
the power of almost every state we cannot even determine 
how many poles there are in current international system. 
As the American scholar, Joseph S. Nye Jr. admits, “World 
politics today is like a three-dimensional chess game. At 
the top level, military power among states is unipolar; but 
at the middle level, of interstate economic relations, the 
world is multipolar and has been so for more than a decade. 
At the bottom level, of transnational relations (involving 
such issues as climate change, illegal drugs, pandemics, 
and terrorism), power is chaotically distributed and dif-
fuses to non-state actors.” (Nye, 2009)
When we talk about power in our century, all the ad-
vantages that the US possess in terms of military power, 
should be discussed in terms of its capability to be trans-
lated in bargaining power over the wide range of issues of 
global politics. American military power by itself does not 
contain a threat for those countries that are supposed to be 
considered as poles in coming multipolar world. First of 
all, here are implied the so-called BRICs: Brazil, Russia, 
India and China, which possess vast territories and popu-
lations, and with the exception of Brazil, all possess nu-
clear weapons as well. Given these circumstances, there is 
virtually no possibility the US will be involved in armed 
conflict with any of the mentioned states. Therefore, with 
respect to these countries, the ability of the US military 
power to be transformed into the bargaining power re-
duces, but does not disappear. As Nye puts it, “in today’s 
information age, success is the result not merely of whose 
army wins but also of whose story wins”. (Nye, 2009) In 
such reality, the US should strengthen the attractiveness of 
its soft power and in combination with its hard power, turn 
it into what is called as a smart power.1 This will be pos-
sible only if the US is able to convince the rest of the world 
that cooperation is a symbiotic and mutually advantageous 
arrangement. 
The Obama administration recognizes both the 
strength and limitations of American power and pragmati-
cally highlights its real capabilities. Accordingly, the cur-
rent US administration is aware of the reality, that despite 
the fact it still remains the only superpower (and, in terms 
of military power, its superiority is not going to be endan-
gered even in the next decades) it can no longer act as a 
unilateral hegemon. However, the US can influence inter-
national events if it manages to convince other countries 
that cooperation is in the best interest of maintaining liber-
al institutions that represent the bedrock of 21st century in-
ternational relations. Reinforcing and strengthening these 
institutions will simultaneously allow the United States to 
maintain its leadership position. 
Another change the Obama foreign policy is based on 
is that the current order that is a kind of hierarchical lib-
eral institutionalism, based on the American hegemony, is 
no longer adequate for today’s world. It is more and more 
often recognized that the current form of the liberal insti-
tutionalism that was established after the World War II, is 
experiencing a legitimacy crisis and is no longer able to 
deal with the challenges of our century.
If in the Cold War era being under the US shield was 
welcomed by the capitalist world, circumstances have 
changed after is has ended. Until the threats coming from 
the Soviet empire were real for the members of the capital-
ist world, the US was allowed to act as a hegemon at the 
expense of providing security guarantees for them. This 
means that the US was actually “buying” the right to have 
a unilateral foreign policy from the rest of the world for the 
cost of security assistance guarantees. After the end of the 
Cold War, on the one hand, the threats coming from the So-
viet Union disappeared, as a result of which the “redemp-
tion” of the right for unilateral actions became difficult 
for the US. On the other hand, after the engagement in the 
open, liberal, rule-based, more or less peaceful internation-
al relations, a number of states started to gain power. The 
rising states started to struggle for pursuing their interests 
that quite often, were in contradiction with America’s in-
terests. Amid these developments, problems of legitimacy 
were raised about the institutions of the liberal world order 
that were created after the World War II and were based 
on the realities of that period. Today the major problem of 
these institutions lies in the absence of representativeness 
that would reflect the current distribution of power in the 
world.  
American scholar, John Ikenberry,2 in his article “Lib-
eral Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of 
Liberal World Order” describes the events, that have fur-
ther intensified the legitimacy crisis of the current world 
order. According to Ikenberry, gradual shifts in the global 
system are two-fold. On the one hand, he points out the 
unfolding of human rights and “responsibility to protect” 
revolution and on the other hand, the opportunities for 
non-state actors or transnational gangs of individuals, to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction, as a result of which it 
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is now the weakness of states and their inability to enforce 
laws and order within their own societies that provide the 
most worrisome dangers to the international system. Due 
to these shifts, the international community is seen as hav-
ing a legitimate interest in what goes on within countries. 
The result is gradual erosion in norms of state sovereignty 
which means that the international system has created a 
new ‘license’ for powerful states to intervene in the domes-
tic affairs of weak and troubled states. (Ikenberry, 2009) 
Meanwhile, independent actions of some powerful states 
when it comes to interfering in the internal affairs of any 
other state, do not have a degree of legitimacy and there-
fore, are reasons for disagreements and dissatisfactions 
among the international society. As an example we can 
bring the case of the US intervention in Iraq.  
Based on these developments, Ikenberry suggests that 
as the liberal international order will increasingly find it-
self concerned with the internal governance of states, the 
international community is going to need capacities and le-
gitimate authority to intervene in weak and troubled states. 
(Ikenberry, 2009) And the high degree of legitimacy can 
only enjoy those institutions where all the major states of 
contemporary world are represented.
While, as a result of the ongoing processes in the 
world, the basis of liberal institutionalism as a current form 
of world order is being shaken, incentives and pressures 
are emerging for its reorganization. Barack Obama’s ad-
ministration could, on the one hand, recognize (but not 
articulate, due to domestic political situation) the simple 
reality that any world order that is based on the domina-
tion of one nation over the others, is doomed to fail. On 
the other hand, the administration sees the natural flows 
in international relations, following which leads to the re-
construction of existing international institutions. In such 
circumstances, if the US will try to stay as a hegemon and 
dominant, it will endanger the liberal institutionalism, as a 
form of the world order as a whole. While, if it acts not as a 
dominant but as primus inter pares, it will be able to ensure 
the maintenance of liberal institutionalism by its transfor-
mation in such a way that the interests of rising states will 
be taken into account. 
Thus, if the United States wants to maintain its leader-
ship in the frames that the current world order allows, it 
has to subordinate to the new requirements of the order 
that it once created. If the US leads the natural flows for 
the evolution of the world order, it will have to give up cer-
tain privileges and with them, certain obligations as well. 
However, it can remain a leader in forming the agenda of 
international relations and that is the role that the US will 
have to play for quite a long time. Through the observa-
tions of the latest developments in the world (e.g. the Arab 
Spring), it became obvious that the so called rising powers 
are not ready to take responsibility for the events that take 
place outside their borders unless their vital interests are 
endangered. This reality is not supposed to change in the 
coming decade as well. Therefore, the world needs flexible 
leadership from the United States that should be expressed 
in the formation of agenda and subsequently, in convincing 
the major players to cooperate in its implementation. 
It is noteworthy, that the current world order promotes 
the deeper cooperation among the states. In his paper 
“Interpolar World: a New Scenario,” Giovanni Grevi3, a 
scholar at the EU Institute for Security Studies, formu-
lates the theory of the modern international system that he 
considers as “interpolar”. As the author explains, the term 
“interpolar” involves not only the existence of an interna-
tional system where there are more than two poles, but also 
implies a strong interdependency between the poles. Ac-
cording to Grevi, the interpolar system creates basis for the 
convergence of interests of main international actors and 
focuses on the frameworks and procedures that could help 
bring cooperative solutions to shared challenges. This has 
a very simple reason: there are expanding ranges of serious 
challenges that affect many countries while none of them, 
no matter how powerful, can unilaterally provide for its 
prosperity, stability and security. Therefore, the interpolar 
system puts the emphasis on cooperative solutions and col-
lective security and focuses on the process and institutions 
by which the convergence of the main powers around com-
mon priorities can be fostered. (Grevi, 2009)
Current US administration realizes the necessity of 
cooperation with the global actors, including the rising 
powers, in order to deal with the major challenges of the 
contemporary world. As Hillary Clinton once said, “Amer-
ica cannot solve the most pressing problems on our own, 
and the world cannot solve them without America”. (Nye, 
2009) Now it is easy to understand the US administration 
that stresses “multipartnership” – the USA realizes that it 
cannot maintain world domination on its own. The US goal 
is to choose privileged partners in international relations 
in order to obtain support for its leadership. As an asso-
ciate editor of the Financial Times and its chief political 
commentator, Philip Stephens notes, “if the US president 
realizes the margins of American power, he will be able to 
sustain it … today we are facing a choice: either we should 
live in the world where powerful and influential states are 
limited with the frames of multilateral cooperation, or 
where the narrow national interests and aspirations result 
in confrontation”. (Stephens, 2009)
Reimagining America’s Role in the World4
Taking into consideration the above-described chang-
es that are taking place in the international system, the 
Obama administration aims to reimagine the role and 
place of America in the new world order. The world still 
needs the US’s leadership. Issues, such as the maintenance 
of the open and stable economic system, climate change 
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and global warming, nuclear proliferation, the fight against 
international crime – all require American leadership. To-
day, America is the only state that possesses the necessary 
power and influence to lead in dealing with the above men-
tioned issues and succeed in involving all relevant global 
players in the process as they are common for all. The US 
leadership, as well as the peaceful evolution of the interna-
tional order depends on how America succeeds to engage 
the world’s leading states into the cooperation for resolu-
tion of these issues. 
When President Obama talks about American lead-
ership, he recognizes that it is essential, but explains that 
“real leadership” means creating the conditions for others 
to step up. Leadership, as Obama puts it “does not mean 
acting alone — it means shaping the conditions for the 
international community to act together.” As to his mind, 
“leadership” usually refers to the act of taking initiative to 
drive an effort toward a valuable goal (U.S. Africa Com-
mand). Evaluating his presidency, in one of his recent in-
terviews Obama describes his foreign policy doctrine: “It’s 
an American leadership that recognizes the rise of coun-
tries like China, India and Brazil. It’s a U.S. leadership that 
recognizes our limits in terms of resources and capacity. 
And yet what I think we’ve been able to establish is a clear 
belief among other nations that the United States continues 
to be the one indispensable nation in tackling major inter-
national problems.”(Zakaria, 2012)
Much of the conciliatory tone of the Obama admin-
istration is a result of the heritage with which it had to 
deal – complicated foreign politics and damaged reputa-
tion due to the unilateralistic actions of his predecessor that 
caused discontent even within the traditional allies of the 
US. Obama’s first task was to restore prestige of the United 
States, regain goodwill of its allies and seek partnerships 
for urgent tasks. 
As the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton puts it, the 
United States under Obama is a smart power, a participant 
in a “new era of engagement based on common interests, 
shared values, and mutual respect.” (U.S. Department of 
State, 2009) Clinton as well as the Obama administration 
as a whole is an advocate of the so called “smart power” 
that as she defines it, is “the full range of tools at our dis-
posal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and 
cultural – picking the right tool, or combination of tools, 
for each situation.” (U.S. Department of State)
Interestingly enough, the Obama administration de-
taches power in its traditional sense from influence and 
believes that the more the United States is respected in the 
world, the more diplomatic power it acquires. Foreign Pol-
icy magazine, that has awarded Barack Obama the second 
place among the 100 global thinkers for the “reimagining 
America’s role in the world”, gives interesting evaluation 
of his presidency: “with his “smart power” mantra, the man 
who commands the world’s most powerful military has di-
versified the United States’ arsenal of foreign-policy tools 
by listening. He spoke to the Muslim world from Cairo, 
smoothed over a rift with Europe, and reached out to recal-
citrant rogue states.” (Foreign Policy’s first annual list of 
the top 100 global thinkers)
The Obama administration believes that for America’s 
image in the world (and therefore, its soft power), it is es-
sential that its actions on the world stage have legitimacy 
that can only be granted through the authorization of inter-
national institutions. Keeping in mind the Iraq experience, 
Obama’s actions in case of Libya absolutely opposed of 
those of his predecessor’s. First, Obama made sure that op-
position in Libya that demanded the removal of Kaddafi 
was a considerable force, which guaranteed that America 
would not be blamed in acting without considering the 
opinion of local population. In this case, the foreign in-
tervention was required and approved by locals. Second, 
he took care of the legitimacy of America’s intervention 
in a sovereign country. For this reason, America entered 
the country only after the authorization of the UN Secu-
rity Council. Third, the Obama administration, conscious 
of America’s image in Muslim world, had to ensure that 
its intervention in Libya would not be labeled as Western 
intervention in the Muslim land. Therefore, the US gained 
regional legitimacy through the approval of Arab League, 
some members of which had even joined the coalition. Fi-
nally, the United States made its European allies acknowl-
edge that intervention in Libya was more in their interests 
than in American; therefore, they would have to constitute 
a large part of the coalition and fund a large share of its 
expenses. As a result, if we do not consider one part of do-
mestic opposition who were criticizing Obama for “lead-
ing from behind”, there was no one else who would blame 
the US for its action: on the international stage, the inter-
vention had the widest possible legitimacy and there was 
no one to blame America for imperialistic intentions, while 
on the domestic stage the lack of dissatisfaction was due to 
law costs5 of the intervention and no American casualties. 
When Obama was accused in subordinating the US 
freedom of action to international institutions, he declared 
that he “will never hesitate to use our military swiftly, de-
cisively, and unilaterally when necessary”. (Feith, 2011) 
Indeed, when Obama saw America’s vital interests endan-
gered, he has never stepped back from the use of hard pow-
er and has been even tougher than his predecessor. On the 
one hand, through special operations, he shot most Al-Qae-
da leaders living in Pakistan, including Bin Laden. On the 
other hand, as he saw that Iran was not going to negotiate, 
that has excluded the possibility to neutralize the threats of 
its nuclear program without serious pressure, Obama has 
managed to gain international support for imposing tighter 
sanctions on Iran. In this way, Obama managed to recon-
cile Israel that was much more skeptical about him before. 
As Fareed Zakaria notes in his article “The Strategist”,  the 
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fact that Chinese and Russians signed on to new sanctions 
against Iran at the U.N., as well as the fact that  Washing-
ton’s European and East Asian allies have gone further in 
cutting off economic ties with Iran, would not have hap-
pened without significant multilateral diplomacy. (Zakaria, 
2012)
While talking about the Arab Spring, Fareed Zakaria 
highlights Obama’s excellent ability to prescience events 
that enabled him to conclude that the democracy protests 
had become unstoppable and the regimes were doomed. 
This gave him an opportunity to place the US in the right 
side of a historical wave. Therefore, Egyptians would 
know that whether they succeed or fail on their path, it 
is because of themselves, and not Washington. Besides, 
as Zakaria notes, the Obama administration could suc-
cessfully distinguished Iran’s Green movement from the 
Arab Spring. The White House quickly concluded that the 
movement would not be able to succeed and limited itself 
with rhetorical support only that enabled Washington not 
to escalate already tense relationships with the current Ira-
nian administration which was supposed to stay in power 
after the wave was over. (Zakaria, 2012)
The Obama administration is closely following the 
power redistribution process in the world, according to 
which a gradual, but stable rise of the Far East is observed. 
Naturally, this process is accompanied by outlining of such 
rising states as China and India. The first actively strives 
for the leadership on the mainland, while the latter tries to 
fit the role of a leader of the developing world that was well 
observed during the Doha summits. According to the as-
sessment of Zbigniew Brzezinski, China can significantly 
diminish American role on the mainland of Far East. How-
ever, he explains that it is not likely to lead to anything 
remotely similar to a politically motivated war. It’s more an 
ongoing bargaining and adjustment as China fits itself into 
the new system. (Brzezinski Z. a., 2008)
Despite the existence of conflict of interests between 
the US and the rising powers in a number of areas, it is 
important to acknowledge that none of these states will 
try to overthrow the open, rule-based liberal world or-
der. This is natural, as the existing system has created fa-
vorable conditions for their development. They will only 
fight for the expansion of their rights within this system 
through increasing of their participation in international 
institutions (and therefore, increasing their participation in 
the decision-making process). If we, for example, look at 
China, which as many believe is the main competitor of 
the United States in the 21st century, we will see that its 
development totally depends on the existence of the open, 
liberal system. China, more than any other states needs an 
open world, where it will buy raw materials and export its 
production later. Therefore, the existence of stable, rule-
based and open world order is vitally important for China’s 
development.
Obama administration analyzes this reality. Besides, 
it is well aware of China’s aspirations for leadership on 
the mainland. The difficulty of the Washington’s task lies 
in the fact that on the one hand, it must try to maintain 
maximum influence in the region while on the other hand, 
its presence there should not be perceived too acutely by 
China as a kind of containment policy against it. As Obama 
describes the US politics towards China, America has “sent 
a clear signal that we are a Pacific power that we will con-
tinue to be a Pacific power. But we’ve done this all in the 
context of a belief that a peacefully rising China is good for 
everybody. The only thing we’ve insisted on, as a principle 
in that region, is everybody’s got to play by the same set of 
rules. That’s not unique to China. That’s true for all of us.” 
The US’s moderate presence in the Far East is ac-
ceptable for the whole region as it seeks to ensure balance 
between China and Japan. As Brent Scowcroft6 describes, 
the United States “not only reassures China against Japan, 
and Japan that we are still there when they need us, it also 
gives breathing room to the rest of the Asia. Without that 
US presence and the balance it provides, they might feel 
as though they have to choose between Japan and China. 
That’s a choice none of them wants to make.” (Brzezinski 
Z. a., 2008)
Finally, the Obama administration could manage to 
establish a constructive working relationship with Russia, 
which was strained during the Bush administration. Despite 
the often voiced doubts about Russia’s non-reliability, the 
“reset” of relationships did have tangible positive results 
(The White House).  First of all, as the general working 
atmosphere was improved, two countries could peacefully 
shape the issues where they can cooperate and where they 
must “agree to disagree”.7
Conclusion
Barack Obama’s foreign policy doctrine, as has al-
ready been mentioned, is based on the understanding of 
the changes taking place in global politics that originate in 
the reconstruction of the current world order according the 
current power redistribution in the international system. 
Outlines of the new multipolar world are being shaped, 
where, in order to succeed, the United States will have to 
redefine the meaning of American preeminence and to re-
imagine its role in the new world. 
The Obama administration managed to redefine the 
concept of power, unifying in it any kinds of tools that 
could increase America’s bargaining power. It also suc-
cessfully accomplishes the redefinition of the notion of 
leadership from a hegemon, to a kind of an elder brother, 
which under its initiative, brings together the states fac-
ing the common challenges. Obama’s profound analytical 
ability is revealed in his attempts to reengage even adver-
saries. As in the coming multipolar world, there will be 
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no alliances in their traditional, 19th century sense. Rather, 
there will be the ad hoc alliances where different states will 
cooperate for the resolution of different particular issues. 
Therefore, for a rational, pragmatic politician, there is no 
notion of a sworn enemy, as the majority of the challenges 
characteristic for our century, can be containing threat for 
every country and in this respect, need for cooperation 
on some concrete issues can be raised with any state. The 
United States certain comparative advantage over the other 
global actors lies in the possibility of raising such issues 
and obtaining the necessary support for their implementa-
tion. This will be a role, that the US should fit in during 
the 21st century and if it succeeds, then it has all necessary 
resources to carry out leadership in terms of formation and 
execution of the international agenda through the coming 
decades.
The current US administration realizes that as the ris-
ing powers will start challenging each other’s unilateral ac-
tions, states will begin to move towards multilateral institu-
tions which are supposed to be the only source for granting 
legitimacy to their actions. However, international institu-
tions will themselves be lacking legitimacy before they be-
come objectively representative according to the existing 
power distribution in the contemporary world. This first of 
all, implies the widening of such major international insti-
tutions, as the UN Security Council. 
In the given circumstances, the most important chal-
lenge for the United States in the 21st century will be the 
reforming of the liberal institutionalism, as a form of the 
world order, on the bases of the natural flows towards its 
evolution. In this way America will, for the third time in 
its existence, continue to lead in the formation of an in-
ternational order that will be an open, rule-based, evolu-
tional form of the liberal institutionalism, where the newly 
emerging powers will manage to pursue their vital interests 
and this fact, together with American leadership will be the 
guarantor for the stability of the new international order.
1. Smart power is a term in international relations defined by Joseph Nye 
as “the ability to combine hard and soft power into a winning strategy”. 
(Nye J. S., In Mideast, the goal is ‘smart power’, 2006)
2. G. John Ikenberry is the Professor of Politics and International Affairs 
at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow 
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is the author of 
many different books and publications majority of which deal with the 
future of liberal institutionalism and the US role in international relations 
of the 21st century.
3. Giovanni Grevi is Senior Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Secu-
rity Studies, he deals with the development of the EU foreign and 
security policy, institutional questions and civilian crisis management.
4. Foreign Policy has awarded Barack Obama the second place among 
the 100 global thinkers for the “reimagining America’s role in the world”.
5. According to Fareed Zakaria, the direct costs of the Libya operation so 
far have been less than $1 billion, about 0.1% of what has been spent on 
Iraq. (Zakaria, 2012)
6. Brent Scowcroft Served as National Security Advisor to Presidents 
George H. W. Bush and Gerald Ford, and as Military Assistant to Presi-
dent Richard Nixon. He is President of The Scowcroft Group, an interna-
tional business and financial advisory firm.
7. For example, in April 2010 Obama and Medvedev signed a new START 
agreement; President Obama and President Medvedev worked closely 
with other members of the UN Security Council to reach an agreement on 
UN Security Council Resolution 1929 that implied the most comprehen-
sive set of sanctions against Iran to date; Russia joined the United States 
in supporting UN Security Council resolution 1874 in response to North 
Korea’s nuclear test. The resolution tightened sanctions against North 
Korea; the U.S. and Russia have made significant progress in developing 
the common nonproliferation agenda; the Obama Administration has ex-
panded the volume of supplies being shipped to our troops in Afghanistan 
through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), thanks in part to Rus-
sia’s agreement to allow ground and air transit for troops and supplies for 
Afghanistan through its territory etc. (The White House)
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